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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of Pakistan’s fiscal policy is sustained economic growth with 
declining debt services, poverty alleviation, the creation of employment opportunities and 
investment in human and physical infrastructure. The tax to GDP ratio fluctuated in a 
narrow band of 10 to11 percent for almost one decade because of half hearted attempts to 
reform tax procedure. On the revenue side, tax-GDP and revenue to GDP ratios either 
remain stagnant or secular decline, mainly due to structural weaknesses in the tax system 
and administration at the federal level and at provincial government level. The 
expenditure of the government in relation to GDP with total expenditure is also showing, 
overall decline since the beginning of 1980. 
In the short run, fiscal policy can be considered expansionary when public 
expenditures exceed public revenues and the resulting deficit can be explained as to 
finance additional government expenditures. If these expenditures are growth enhancing, 
then a government deficit reveal an indirect effect on long-term economic growth. In a 
Ricardian economy, deficit simply means taxes delayed, there should be no difference 
between tax and deficit finance of government expenditures, as long as the tax structure 
remains unchanged in the future [Ludvigson (1996)]. On the other hand, if the economy 
is non-Ricardian, then public deficits can change the private incentives to accumulation 
and   influence the rate of growth of the economy.  
In Pakistan, higher level of current budget deficit are financed significantly by 
government borrowings these, raise the interest burden, future expenditure as well as 
expectations of higher taxes. Thus debt financing is an important variable in the nexus 
between tax revenue and expenditure. Although the relationship between revenue and 
expenditure is still an unsettled issue, the main purpose of the present study is to check 
and explain the relationship between tax revenue and expenditure variables in the context 
of Pakistan. 
The various estimates to test the revenue/tax-expenditure nexus are examined in 
context to different countries and different results have been found, this study attempts to 
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investigate the causality between government expenditure and tax revenue in Pakistan but 
it differs from earlier studies on the following aspects. 
Firstly, it examines two-hypothesis tax-spend or spend-tax by granger causality 
test verification in context of Pakistan. Secondly, it investigates for long run relationship 
between both of the variables with current data. The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 describes the overview of theoretical literature and literature review. 
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology and empirical result. Section 4 provides 
conclusion. 
 
2.  FISCAL CONDITION IN PAKISTAN 
In Pakistan, since the last decades, on the revenue side, tax-to-GDP and hence, 
revenue-to-GDP ratios either remain constant or showed secular decline, due to structural 
deficiencies in the tax system or administration, at federal level and at provincial level. 
The expenditure to GDP exhibits a similar pattern. In 2008-09, the decline in total 
expenditures 40 percentage points of GDP is shared by current expenditures 1.5 
percentage points of GDP and development expenditures 2.1 percentage points of GDP 
total revenue as percentage of GDP increase due to improvement in non-tax revenue as 
percent of GDP, excise duty contribution in revenue is 9 percent, total tax revenue as 
percentage of GDP remained at 10-11 percent since last decades due to structural 
weakness in tax system in Pakistan. The indirect tax and sales tax have a relatively high 
contribution in tax revenue, in total, indirect tax to GDP ratio stood at 5 percent  and 
direct tax-to-GDP ratio that remains always low, requires a considerable policy measures 
in order to widen the tax base and strength the tax administration. 
The average growth of FBR tax collection was around 16 percent during the 
current period comparative to the growth rate of 12 percent during the decades of 
1990s.The growth rate from 12-16 percent shows the positive impact of tax reforms if 
nominal GDP growth rate is increasing in isolation. While the falling tax-to-GDP implies 
that nominal GDP grew at a faster rate than tax growth. 
In Pakistan, indirect taxes contribute 60 percent of total revenue generally  and 
particularly custom collection falls during the last decades, mostly due to trade 
liberalisation and GST contribution. With relation to tax, there has been a difficult time 
on expenditures side for the economy of Pakistan due to many unexpected events on both 
the domestic and external level [Economic Survey of Pakistan (2008-09)], if better fiscal 
discipline and expenditure management adopt, it would lead to drastic improvement in 
fiscal discipline. Total expenditures have fluctuated between 16-20 percent of GDP 
during the last 18 years. Negative growth in total expenditures is due to significant 
decline at the cost of a decline in development spending with 15.1 percent. There is a 
increase in total expenditures during 1980–2009 from 63.6 to 2431 billion with account 
of current expenditures from 37.8 to 2066 and interest payment 5.9 to 624 and defense 
expenditures 15.3 to 3123 billion but growth is negative in real expenditures with total 
expenditures 7.7 to –13.1, current 10.5 to –9.3, development 2.7 to –29.6 and defense 
expenditures decline 8.9 to –5.7 percent. 
In future, to encourage judicious distribution of the tax burden among the different 
sectors of the economy it is necessary to expand the tax net to un-taxed and under-taxed 
sectors and also to achieve targeted tax-to-GDP ratio which is around 15 percent.  
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3.  OVERVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The relationship between tax and spending is discussed in the literature with the 
help of four hypotheses, namely the tax-and-spend hypothesis, the spend-and-tax 
hypothesis, the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis, and the institutional separation 
hypothesis. 
 
Tax-Spend Hypothesis 
According to Friedman (1978) the level of spending adjust to the level of tax 
available and causality runs from tax to expenditure. This hypothesis defines a positive 
relationship between government spending and taxation. If tax revenue are increased 
government spending will also increase and will decrease with the decrease in tax 
revenue. As Government want to spend whatever is available for spending.  
Buchanan and Wagner (1977, 1978) and Niskanen (1978, 2002, and 2006) 
presented an alternative version of the tax-spend hypothesis that is negative relationship 
between federal expenditure and tax revenues. Contrary to Friedman (1978), they suggest 
that higher taxes would lead to spending reductions. According to fundamentals of the 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977, 1978) taxpayers suffer from fiscal illusion. They argue that 
tax cuts lower the perceived price of government provided goods and services by the 
public, which increases quantity demanded of these goods and services. However, the 
public may incur even higher costs. One reason for this is the indirect inflation taxation 
that results from excessive money creation by the government. Another reason is higher 
interest rates associated with government debt financing that may crowd out private 
investment. To reduce expenditures, Buchanan and Wagner favour limit the ability of 
government for deficit financing. In sum, tax changes bring changes in spending, the 
relationship between the two is a negative. This hypothesis is also known as the “revenue 
dominance hypothesis” [Hasan and Lincclon (1997)]. 
While Friedman (1978) and others believe that lower deficits require lower taxes 
and they oppose tax hikes as a means of reducing budget deficits [see Darrat (1998, 
2002)] other proponents of the tax-and-spend hypothesis such as Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977) believe that tax increases as a means of solving the budget deficits. Thus, 
combined increases in taxes with spending cuts will lower budget deficits contrast with 
Friedman (1978) Who explains a positive causal relationship between the two fiscal 
variables, Buchanan and Wagner (1977) hypothesise a negative relationship [see Darrat 
(1998, 2002)]. 
 
Spend-Tax Hypothesis 
According to the spend-and-tax hypothesis, government first spends than tax 
policies and revenues are adjusted to accommodate the desired level of spending. It is 
expenditure that causes taxes where causality runs from spending to revenue. According 
to Peacock and Wiseman (1979) once a relatively high level of taxation and expenditure 
is set during extra ordinary situations like wars, natural disasters, or deep recessions 
justify temporary increases in expenditures and taxes to pay them so, that public sector is 
permanently enlarged. From a policy perspective, the optimal solution for the proponents 
of the spend-and-tax hypothesis, a spending restraint is required to reduce public deficits 
and reducing expenditure for sustain current budget deficits.  
Aisha and Khatoon 
 
954
Another explanation of this hypothesis is based on the research of Barro (1974, 
1979, 1986). In his tax smoothing hypothesis, government spending is considered as an 
exogenous/dependent variable to which taxes adjust. Moreover, the intertemporal budget 
constraint requires that an increase in current expenditures higher future taxes. Therefore 
Barro, rejects the concept that the taxpayers suffer from fiscal illusion.  Within the 
framework of the Ricardian equivalence theorem, he explain that taxpayers are rational 
that an increase in the current debt in nothing but a delayed burden in form of taxation. 
Taxpayers are, therefore, expected to fully capitalise the future tax liability. This 
hypothesis is also known as “expenditure dominance hypothesis”. 
 
 
Fiscal Synchoronisation Hypothesis 
The first of these is the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis where it is postulated 
that the government take decision to tax and to spend is simultaneously and changes 
occur concurrently and causality runs in both directions. To the proponents of this 
hypothesis, the quantity and quality of public goods offered by the public sector reflects 
the preferences of the community and the size of the government is determined by the 
welfare-maximising choice of a decisive individual and the decisive voter chooses the 
appraisal and comparison the marginal cost and benefits associated with government 
alternative packages implement by the government [Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. 
According to Musgrave (1966, p. 19) the expenditure and tax sides of the budget must be 
decided jointly’ so as to maximise society’s intertemporal social welfare function. The 
government budgetary process works on incremental basis therefore according to 
Wildavsky (1964) government expenditure and tax revenue determines each other 
simultaneously. So the implication of this hypothesis that causality runs in bidirectional. 
 
Institutional Separation Hypothesis 
According to this hypothesis the management and legislative government branches 
have different taxation and spending functions because such all these are different institutions. 
So all these institutions have independent decisions regarding expenditure and revenues, 
indicating no causal relationship between government expenditure and tax revenue. 
 The institutional separation hypothesis suggests that there is no inter-temporal 
causality between public expenditure and public revenue. This absence of causal link is 
due to ‘many important actors with divergent interests and agendas’ [Hoover and Sheffrin 
(1992), p. 246] and that the disagreement between parties or groups in the decision-
making process is a cause for the growing pattern of public debt [Drazen (2001); Persson, 
et al. (2000)]. A major advocate of this view is Wildavsky (1988). 
Who maintains that ‘budgeting can be incremental and adjustments can be made 
on the margin if these separate institutions reach a consensus on the fundamentals. 
 
4.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
For finding the hypothesis and causality between government expenditure and tax 
revenue previous studies that took place include [Dhanasekaran (2001); Friedman (1972–
1978); Blakely (1986); Marlow (1986); Barro (1999); Wiseman (1979)]. This issue has 
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been investigated for a number of countries, but a consensus has not been reached about 
the nexus between government revenues and expenditures. The results from these 
empirical studies are sensitive to the sample period under examination, the degree of 
temporal aggregation, the inclusion of macroeconomic controls, and the choice of 
econometric methodology.  
The spend-tax hypothesis in the one hand, predict that governments spend first and 
then increase ax revenues to finance their expenditures [Peacock and Wiseman (1979); 
Barro (1981)]. 
According to (S. H. Hussain) in case of Pakistan there is unidirectional causality 
exist, spend to tax that is support to Barro hypothesis and the result that TR does not 
cause GE can best and only be explained by the political economy of Pakistan where the 
main expenditures are the outlays chiefly determined politically by bureaucratic and 
military influence (defense, debt servicing, general administration). The case of India has 
been recently examined by Dhanasekaran (2001) who found evidence in support of the 
spend tax hypothesis. It is evident, therefore, that the question remains empirically 
unsettled. He conclude for absence of co integration between both of the variables, 
unidirectional causality exist in case of India. S. Raju paper support for both the 
expenditures lead revenues (spend and tax hypothesis) and revenues lead expenditures 
(tax and spend hypothesis) between total receipts/tax receipts and different categories of 
expenditures at the level of the central government for India. In case of Turkey studied by 
Abu Wahid, using the Granger-causality testing, the results support the hypothesis that 
government expenditure causes tax revenues to increase in Turkey. 
The so-called hypothesis tax-spend postulates that government raises tax revenues 
ahead of engaging in new expenditures [Friedman (1978); Buchanan and Wagner (1974); 
Blakely (1986); Marlow and Manage  (1987); Owoye (1995)]. Ewing and Payne (1998) 
have examined the case of five Latin American countries using pool data technique 
finding mixed results for the countries in their sample. Park (1998) researched for the 
case of Korea and found supporting evidence for the tax-spend hypothesis. Debi, et al. 
worked for transitional economics, the empirical findings which are based granger 
causality test, supporting the tax-spend hypothesis. However, Friedman (1972, 1978) 
supports the view that increasing taxes means that one would have just as large a deficit 
but at a higher level of government expenditures. Owoye (1995) conducted a study of G7 
countries and finds that the direction of causality runs from tax revenues to government 
expenditures in the case of Japan and Italy. Cheng (1999) in a study of eight Latin 
American countries detects a similar direction. 
There is also the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis that suggests that government 
take decisions about revenues and expenditure simultaneously [Musgrave (1996); 
Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. Studied on this hypothesis worked by Mariam, et al. for the 
case of Malaysia and found bi-directional causality supporting the view of fiscal 
synchronisation hypothesis. Furthermore, Manage and Marlow (1986) find the presence 
of bi-directional causality between U.S. federal revenues and expenditures for 1929–82. 
 
Data 
Data that is used here taken from various issues of economic survey of Pakistan, 
international financial statistics from the year 1972 to 2007.  Data choice depends on the 
availability of data and time period effect after separation Pakistan. 
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5.  METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Granger Causality and Co-integration Test 
The mostly used method to estimate causality is Granger Causality Test which 
shows the direction of causality. Before applying the Granger Causality test it is must 
to check the stationary of the variables. If the variables are stationary then apply 
Causality test. If variables are non-stationary, then make the ADF test to the 1st 
difference or logarithm and obtain the stationary series because the Granger 
Causality, if applied on non-stationary variables will lead to spurious regression and 
may provide wrong results. 
In the same way co-integration test to non-stationary variables also provides 
spurious regression. So according to Engel Granger Co-integration if the linear 
combination of non-stationary variables is stationary variables have long-run relationship. 
To avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity we have taken the natural log of both of the 
variables so variables are defined as LNTR and LNGE. 
 
Unit Root Test 
∆ GEt   =   ά1 + ά2 + β GE t–1 + Σ δ ∆GE t–1 + μt  
∆ TR t = ά1 + ά2 + β TR t–1 + Σ δ ∆TR t–1 + μt  
Where ά ά are constants, t represents time or trends and is pure white noise error term. 
The null and alternative hypotheses are Ho: β=0 and H1: β < 0. If ADF value of ∆LN GEt   
is greater than the MacKinnon value at 1 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent level of 
significance the null hypothesis is accepted which shows that ∆LN GEt   has unit root and 
is non-stationary. On the other side if null hypothesis is rejected show that GE is 
stationary. 
 
Results of ADF Test 
                      ADF Critical Critical Critical  
 Value (1% Value (5% Value (10% 
Variable Level) Level) Level)  Result 
LNGE –2.160618 –4.252879 –3.548490 –3.207094 Non-stationary 
∆LNGE –4.951326 –3.639407 –2.951125 –2.614300 Stationary 
LNTR –1.948808 –3.639407 –2.951125 –2.614300 Non-stationary 
∆LNTR –8.623730 –3.639407 –2.951125 –2.614300 Stationary 
  vt –3.778997 –3.632900 –2.948404 –2.612874 Stationary 
 
The results of ADF are showing that the ADF value of LNTR and LNGE  are both 
greater than Mackinnon value at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance 
so null hypothesis is accepted ,both the variables are non-stationary. While 1st difference 
of both variables ∆LNGE and ∆LNTR are stationary at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
level of significance. 
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Granger Causality Test 
For Granger Causality economic variables must be stationary which have been 
proved by the unit root test that GE and TR are stationary at 1st difference. 
 
Results of Granger Causality Test 
     H0          Obs           F Value          P Value           Result 
LNTR does not Granger Cause LNGE     34           0.88922          0.42188         Accept H0 
 
LNGE does not Granger Cause LNTR           3.02703          0.06398         Reject H0 
 
 
The results of causality represent that in case of Pakistan GE are cause to TR and 
TR are not cause to GE. Therefore the results verity unidirectional causality i.e. spends 
and tax hypothesis. It is found that GE does not depend on TR so only the tax revenue 
may tend to reduce the budget deficit but this is difficult to answer only considering the 
causal relationship between two variables. Proper cost and benefit analysis of any change 
in taxation and expenditure is needed in order to study the problem of federal deficit. 
Further it implies that Pakistan’s government first engages in spending and after 
that to pay for this spending raise taxes to boost government revenue but it may have 
negative impact on investors and human capital that is skilled one because of fear to pay 
higher taxes in future. Due to this problem capital may flight. 
 
Engle Granger Co-integration Test 
Co-integration defines that if the 1st difference of variable is stationary there is 
cointegration (long-run relationship) between the variables. Two methods are used in 
order to check co-integration. 1st method is presented by Engel and Granger it deals with 
two variables and the 2nd method is presented by Johns and Juselius based on Vector 
Auto Regression and this method is used for three or more variables. 
Here because of two variables we have used Granger co-integration test. 1st we 
regress TR on GE as follows. 
LNTR t = ά1 + ά2LN GE t+ μt 
The results of OLS regression are 
LNTR = 0.048999 + 0.992287*LNGE + vt 
 
   S. E.      (0.173941)   (0.014539)                Adjusted R2 = 0.992540    D.W = 1.302447 
    t          ( 0.281698)   (68.24909)                    F = 4657.939       Prob = 0.00000           
In second step we check the stationarity of residual by the help of ADF.  Here the 
ADF value is smaller than Mackinnon critical value at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
level of significance the residual is stationary because it has no unit root. So the results 
show that there is co integration relationship between TR and GE. The OLS regression is 
showing the co integration relationship that is long run relationship between TR and GE. 
A 1 percent rise in GE raises tax revenue by 0.99.  
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Here the coefficient of government expenditure is positive and significant which 
indicates that economic activity enhances as government increases its expenditure as a 
result tax base and tax revenue also increases because of high income. The results 
represent that in the long run the most important factor that affects tax revenue is 
government expenditure. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
In this study, the causal relationship between government total expenditure and 
government total revenue has been studied. In general, the results support the Barro 
hypothesis that government expenditure causes revenues. The result that TR does not 
cause GE can only be explained by the political economy of Pakistan where the main 
expenditures are the determined politically by bureaucratic and military influence 
(defense, debt servicing, general administration). Most of these consumption expenditure 
are for self interests rather than overall welfare.  
The results conclude that while government expenditures and revenues exhibit 
a stable long run relationship there exists unilateral causality from expenditures to 
revenues in Pakistan. That is, although the possibility of budget deficit explosion in 
the long-run is limited, the government decide to spend first and then raise tax 
revenues and request for grants to finance its expenditures, rather than adopting the 
method of raising funds first and collect revenues and take decision to spending later 
according the revenues. 
In general, a major portion of development expenditure in Pakistan is the residual 
amount left over from different consumption expenditure. Furthermore, seeing that our 
tests can not guarantee the final benchmark remedy of the issue of reducing the deficit, 
we cannot support increasing tax revenues over decreasing expenditure. Only reducing 
the expenditures can not solely be resolution; rather, what we need primarily is (i) 
reduction in the size of large consumption expenditures and use them for development 
and other investment expenditures, thereby moving towards Pareto optimal solutions, (ii) 
in determining the new development purpose and implement outlays, economic 
efficiency should be preferred over political determination. 
In addition, as is the target for this nexus, as the tax and tariff reform programme 
of the government, we must need  expenditure reform  in which inclusive cost benefit 
analyses should be conducted for government expenditures together with the analyses of 
adopting optimal approach for gradual shifting and reformation. This whole scenario 
should be reanalysed in a general equilibrium framework in order to spread distributional 
consequences of expenditure on the entire economy.  
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